【本期主题】 Optimal Liquidity Policy

This paper presents a simple model of liquidity demand and supply. We show that competitive market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, and that the inefficiency is present both in ex ante market design and in spot market participation. Therefore, policy intervention is needed both at the initial market design stage and in the spot market when liquidity shortage arises. We show that different policy interventions have different efficiency consequences under different market conditions. For example, while subsidizing liquidity providers ex ante (e.g., designated market makers) is generally efficient, the market liquidity might be too high especially when the probability of liquidity event is small;  spot interventions that subsidize sellers (e.g., relaxing capital requirements, subsidizing loan modifications) is generally more effective at reducing the cost of default than subsidizing buyers (e.g., public-private partnership to purchase toxic assets), especially since subsidization to buyers in the spot market might hinder the incentives of market participants to provide liquidity ex ante.

【报告人】黄春燕           长江商学院金融学教授

【时   间】11月6日       上午10:00

【地   点】明德主楼509

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报告人简介：

       黄春燕博士现为长江商学院金融学教授。黄教授于2003年获得麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院（MIT Sloan School of Management）金融学博士学位，并曾任德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校（The University of Texas at Austin）金融学终身副教授，讲授EMBA及博士学位的课程。她在税收、资产流动性、均衡资产定价，及基金管理等领域具有丰富的学术研究经验。她曾在国际顶级期刊如Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Finance、Review of Financial Studies、Journal of Public Economics等上发表多篇学术论文。

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